qga: Change effective user/group ID in guest-ssh-* commands

Before this commit, when qmp_guest_ssh_add_authorized_keys adds an
SSH key for an existing local user, the agent (running as root) decides
whether to create the user's .ssh directory with a symlink-following
directory test, and then writes and chowns the authorized_keys file.
A local unprivileged user who owns their home directory can pre-stage
their .ssh directory (or the authorized_keys file) as a symbolic link
so that, when the host or operator triggers a key add for that user,
the root agent follows the link and transfers ownership of an arbitrary
root-owned file or directory to the unprivileged user, who can then rewrite
it to obtain root.

Fixes: CVE-2026-12080
Fixes: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/work_items/3929

v1: https://patchew.org/QEMU/20260709105707.91209-1-kkostiuk@redhat.com/
v2 -> v1:
Change effective user/group ID instead of checking for symlinks and
changing ownership of the file.

v2: https://patchew.org/QEMU/20260810104659.82320-1-kkostiuk@redhat.com
v3 -> v2:
Deduplicate code.
Fail daemon when can't rollback effective user/group ID.

v3: https://patchew.org/QEMU/20260810140641.161728-1-kkostiuk@redhat.com/
v4 -> v3:
Added comment about assert in rollback_effective_info
Fix memory leak in rollback_effective_info

Reported-by: Valentino Paulon <valentino.paulon88@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/20260810142818.170418-1-kkostiuk@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Kostiantyn Kostiuk <kkostiuk@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 7e5c85f7f2)
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
This commit is contained in:
Kostiantyn Kostiuk authored and Michael Tokarev committed 2026-09-16 09:36:16 +03:00
1 parent c5c52030eb
commit 05d36c222b
1 file changed
+71
+71
View File
@@ -8,11 +8,34 @@
#include <glib/gstdio.h>
#include <locale.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <grp.h>
#include "commands-common-ssh.h"
#include "qapi/error.h"
#include "qga-qapi-commands.h"
typedef struct EffectiveUserInfo {
uid_t uid;
gid_t gid;
} EffectiveUserInfo;
typedef EffectiveUserInfo *PEffectiveUserInfo;
static void rollback_effective_info(PEffectiveUserInfo info)
{
if (info) {
/* There is nothing to do in case when rollback to original user/group IDs
* fails. In that case, the process will be terminated by the kernel
* and systemd should restart the daemon again.
*/
assert(seteuid(info->uid) == 0);
assert(setegid(info->gid) == 0);
g_free(info);
}
}
G_DEFINE_AUTO_CLEANUP_FREE_FUNC(PEffectiveUserInfo, rollback_effective_info, NULL);
#ifdef QGA_BUILD_UNIT_TEST
static struct passwd *
test_get_passwd_entry(const gchar *user_name, GError **error)
@@ -112,6 +135,36 @@ write_authkeys(const char *path, const GStrv keys,
return true;
}
static PEffectiveUserInfo set_privileges_to_user(const struct passwd *p, Error **errp)
{
g_auto(PEffectiveUserInfo) info = g_new0(EffectiveUserInfo, 1);
info->uid = geteuid();
info->gid = getegid();
#ifndef QGA_BUILD_UNIT_TEST
/* The initgroups requires CAP_SETGID. During build time unit tests, we can't do this. */
if (initgroups(p->pw_name, p->pw_gid) == -1) {
error_setg_errno(errp, errno, "failed to set group for user '%s'",
p->pw_name);
return NULL;
}
#endif
if (setegid(p->pw_gid) == -1) {
error_setg_errno(errp, errno, "failed to set effective group ID for user '%s'",
p->pw_name);
return NULL;
}
if (seteuid(p->pw_uid) == -1) {
error_setg_errno(errp, errno, "failed to set effective user ID for user '%s'",
p->pw_name);
return NULL;
}
return g_steal_pointer(&info);
}
void
qmp_guest_ssh_add_authorized_keys(const char *username, strList *keys,
bool has_reset, bool reset,
@@ -123,6 +176,7 @@ qmp_guest_ssh_add_authorized_keys(const char *username, strList *keys,
g_auto(GStrv) authkeys = NULL;
strList *k;
size_t nkeys, nauthkeys;
g_auto(PEffectiveUserInfo) effective_user_info = NULL;
reset = has_reset && reset;
@@ -135,6 +189,11 @@ qmp_guest_ssh_add_authorized_keys(const char *username, strList *keys,
return;
}
effective_user_info = set_privileges_to_user(p, errp);
if (effective_user_info == NULL) {
return;
}
ssh_path = g_build_filename(p->pw_dir, ".ssh", NULL);
authkeys_path = g_build_filename(ssh_path, "authorized_keys", NULL);
@@ -172,6 +231,7 @@ qmp_guest_ssh_remove_authorized_keys(const char *username, strList *keys,
g_auto(GStrv) authkeys = NULL;
GStrv a;
size_t nkeys = 0;
g_auto(PEffectiveUserInfo) effective_user_info = NULL;
if (!check_openssh_pub_keys(keys, NULL, errp)) {
return;
@@ -182,6 +242,11 @@ qmp_guest_ssh_remove_authorized_keys(const char *username, strList *keys,
return;
}
effective_user_info = set_privileges_to_user(p, errp);
if (effective_user_info == NULL) {
return;
}
authkeys_path = g_build_filename(p->pw_dir, ".ssh",
"authorized_keys", NULL);
if (!g_file_test(authkeys_path, G_FILE_TEST_EXISTS)) {
@@ -219,12 +284,18 @@ qmp_guest_ssh_get_authorized_keys(const char *username, Error **errp)
g_auto(GStrv) authkeys = NULL;
g_autoptr(GuestAuthorizedKeys) ret = NULL;
int i;
g_auto(PEffectiveUserInfo) effective_user_info = NULL;
p = get_passwd_entry(username, errp);
if (p == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
effective_user_info = set_privileges_to_user(p, errp);
if (effective_user_info == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
authkeys_path = g_build_filename(p->pw_dir, ".ssh",
"authorized_keys", NULL);
authkeys = read_authkeys(authkeys_path, errp);