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chore: update SECURITY.md
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@@ -19,3 +19,22 @@ report seriously. You don't need to create a PoC or a patch if that would slow d
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You don't need an elaborate write-up. A short, informal note about the issue is good. We can always
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communicate later to fill in any details we need after that first note is shared with us.
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## Out of Scope
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The following are expected behavior, not vulnerabilities.
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### Unauthenticated WebDAV requests list protected directories
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An unauthenticated `PROPFIND` lists directory entries, including protected ones. This is required by
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WebDAV clients that send no `Authorization` header until challenged with a `401`; hiding the entries
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would leave them seeing only the public directory, with no way to reach protected ones. Listing a
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name grants no access — reads and writes still return `401`/`403` without credentials.
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### XSS from files served by dufs
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Files are served inline with their natural content type, including HTML/SVG/XML, so a malicious file
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executes script on *dufs*'s origin. This is not handled because *dufs* exists to serve the files it
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stores: forcing this active content to download broke opening HTML files from the web UI and was
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reverted. Operators are responsible for not hosting untrusted content and for isolating *dufs* on
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its own origin.
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