Files
new-api/controller/secure_verification.go
T
Calcium-Ion 128089fa7d feat(i18n): translate web console messages in the frontend and AI-client errors in the backend (#7712)
* feat(i18n): translate web console messages in the frontend and AI-client errors in the backend

Chinese text was hard-coded in API messages, stored log content, emails and
server logs, so it reached users of every interface language.

Text is now translated where its reader is:

- Web console APIs return the English source text as message_key with
  message_params, and the web console translates it in all seven languages.
  message keeps the English text for other API callers.
- Errors returned to AI clients, emails and notifications are translated by
  the backend (en, zh-CN, zh-TW) in the language saved on the account, then
  the language of the request's Accept-Language header.
- A reader who states no language still gets the original Chinese text of the
  messages that were Chinese before, word for word. Gateways that use another
  new-api as their upstream match that text, for example to disable a channel
  whose account ran out of quota.
- Usage, top-up and system log content is stored as content_parts (key and
  params) and rendered in the viewer's language. Task fail reasons and refund
  reasons written by the gateway are English keys. Rows written earlier are
  shown as before.
- Server logs are English.

Also:

- The saved interface language zhTW, and zh-HK, zh-MO and zh-Hant, now select
  Traditional Chinese in the backend instead of Simplified Chinese.
- The built-in group descriptions are translated; descriptions an
  administrator saved are shown as written.
- .agents/rules/i18n.md records the conventions. Tests in i18n/ fail on a
  non-English string literal, on a web console message without translations
  and on a locale key without a constant.

* feat(i18n): print server logs in Chinese when LOG_LANGUAGE asks for it

Server log lines are English by default. With LOG_LANGUAGE=zh-CN, the lines
that were Chinese before print their original Chinese text.

common.LogText formats a log line from its English format, which is also the
key of its Chinese text in common/log_text.zh-CN.json. A line without an entry
prints in English. go vet checks the arguments of every call, and
TestServerLogTexts checks that each entry still matches a call and has the
same verbs as its key.

* docs: list LOG_LANGUAGE in the docker compose example

* feat(i18n): translate every server log line and add DEFAULT_LANGUAGE

Every line the gateway prints goes through common.LogText. With
DEFAULT_LANGUAGE=zh-CN, the lines that have a Chinese text in
common/log_text.zh-CN.json print it and the others print English.

DEFAULT_LANGUAGE replaces LOG_LANGUAGE. It also sets the language of
backend messages, emails and notifications for a reader who states no
language: en, zh-CN or zh-TW, English when unset. The list of messages
that stayed Chinese for such readers is removed.

Review fixes:
- Channel test logs store the token name "Model test"; the console shows
  it in the interface language.
- Task fail reasons written by the gateway are fixed sentences the console
  translates. The HTTP status and the upstream detail go to the server log
  when a polled task is failed.
- The auto-disable reason of a slow channel is written in DEFAULT_LANGUAGE.

Also:
- Drop the repository-scanning lint tests, the i18n rules file and its
  read gate. AGENTS.md keeps the conventions in four lines.
- Payment error toasts keep their previous text and only add the
  translated message key.
- Remove guards and helpers that no caller needs.

* fix(i18n): address review on language lookup, notices and error responses

- Relay requests no longer load the user a second time to find the
  language: the settings TokenAuth put into the request are used as they
  are, also when they hold no language.
- Upstream model update notices are rendered in each recipient's saved
  language, DEFAULT_LANGUAGE when none.
- /api/usage/token and /api/log/token answer with backend-translated
  messages again, with the keys and status codes used before this PR.
  Their callers are scripts, not the web console.
- Webhook notifications fill {{value}} placeholders like the other
  senders. Running the rendered text through Sprintf appended
  %!(EXTRA ...) and broke %2F in links.
- RootUserLanguage reads the setting of the root user it already loaded.
- zh_TW and zh_HK are read as Traditional Chinese.
- Add common.ApiErrorStatus for error responses under another HTTP status
  and use it where those responses were built by hand.
- Remove middleware.GetLanguage, which had no callers.
2026-10-09 21:39:51 +08:00

176 lines
8.8 KiB
Go

package controller
import (
"errors"
"net/http"
"slices"
"strings"
"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/common"
"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/logger"
"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/middleware"
"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/model"
"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/oauth"
"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/service"
passkeysvc "github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/service/passkey"
"github.com/QuantumNous/new-api/setting/system_setting"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
"github.com/go-webauthn/webauthn/protocol"
)
func GetVerificationMethods(c *gin.Context) {
identity, ok := middleware.GetStepUpIdentity(c)
if !ok {
writeAccountStatusError(c, http.StatusUnauthorized, "The current sign-in method does not support security verification")
return
}
requirements, err := service.GetVerificationRequirements(identity, c.Query("scope"))
if err != nil {
writeSecurityOperationError(c, err)
return
}
common.ApiSuccess(c, requirements)
}
// writeSecurityOperationError only exposes known, fixed business messages.
// Unexpected errors retain their cause for the existing server-side auth logger.
func writeSecurityOperationError(c *gin.Context, err error) {
status := http.StatusOK
var code, message string
var protocolError *protocol.Error
switch {
case errors.Is(err, passkeysvc.ErrRPIDUnavailable):
code, message = "PASSKEY_RP_ID_UNAVAILABLE", "This Passkey domain is not available on this website. Use its original website or another verification method."
case errors.Is(err, system_setting.ErrPasskeyRPIDInvalid):
code, message = "PASSKEY_RP_ID_INVALID", "Invalid Passkey domain. Enter a domain without a scheme, port, path or wildcard."
case errors.Is(err, service.ErrAccountEmailInvalid), errors.Is(err, service.ErrAccountEmailRestricted):
code, message = "EMAIL_ADDRESS_REJECTED", err.Error()
case errors.Is(err, model.ErrEmailAlreadyTaken):
code, message = "EMAIL_ALREADY_TAKEN", "This email address is already in use."
case errors.Is(err, service.ErrEmailBindingDelivery):
code, message = "EMAIL_BINDING_DELIVERY_FAILED", err.Error()
case errors.Is(err, model.ErrEmailBindingCodeInvalid):
code, message = "EMAIL_BINDING_CODE_INVALID", err.Error()
case errors.Is(err, model.ErrEmailBindingLocked):
code, message = "EMAIL_BINDING_LOCKED", err.Error()
case errors.Is(err, model.ErrEmailBindingResendWait):
status = http.StatusTooManyRequests
code, message = "EMAIL_BINDING_RESEND_WAIT", err.Error()
case errors.Is(err, common.ErrAccountPasswordLength), errors.Is(err, common.ErrAccountPasswordSame), errors.Is(err, common.ErrPasswordLegacyLimit):
code, message = "PASSWORD_POLICY_REJECTED", err.Error()
case errors.Is(err, model.ErrCurrentPasswordInvalid):
code, message = "CURRENT_PASSWORD_INVALID", err.Error()
case errors.Is(err, model.ErrAccountPasswordState), errors.Is(err, model.ErrAccountBindingChanged):
status = http.StatusConflict
code, message = "ACCOUNT_SECURITY_STATE_CHANGED", err.Error()
case errors.Is(err, model.ErrLastLoginMethod):
code, message = "LAST_LOGIN_METHOD", err.Error()
case errors.Is(err, oauth.ErrTelegramOAuthNotConfigured):
code, message = "TELEGRAM_OAUTH_NOT_CONFIGURED", oauth.ErrTelegramOAuthNotConfigured.Error()
case errors.Is(err, oauth.ErrTelegramOAuthConflict):
code, message = "TELEGRAM_OAUTH_CONFLICT", oauth.ErrTelegramOAuthConflict.Error()
case errors.Is(err, oauth.ErrTelegramOAuthFailed):
code, message = "TELEGRAM_OAUTH_FAILED", oauth.ErrTelegramOAuthFailed.Error()
case errors.Is(err, oauth.ErrTelegramAccountNotBound):
code, message = "TELEGRAM_ACCOUNT_NOT_BOUND", oauth.ErrTelegramAccountNotBound.Error()
case errors.Is(err, model.ErrExternalIdentityAlreadyClaimed):
code, message = "ACCOUNT_ALREADY_BOUND", "This external account is already bound."
if c.Param("provider") == "telegram" {
code, message = "TELEGRAM_BIND_ALREADY_BOUND", "This Telegram account is already bound."
}
case errors.Is(err, service.ErrVerificationContextInvalid):
status = http.StatusBadRequest
code, message = "SECURITY_CONTEXT_INVALID", service.ErrVerificationContextInvalid.Error()
case errors.Is(err, service.ErrVerificationForbidden):
status = http.StatusForbidden
code, message = "SECURITY_ACTION_FORBIDDEN", service.ErrVerificationForbidden.Error()
case errors.Is(err, service.ErrVerificationFailed), errors.As(err, &protocolError):
code, message = "SECURITY_VERIFICATION_FAILED", service.ErrVerificationFailed.Error()
case errors.Is(err, service.ErrVerificationLocked):
code, message = "SECURITY_VERIFICATION_LOCKED", service.ErrVerificationLocked.Error()
case errors.Is(err, service.ErrVerificationUnavailable):
code, message = "SECURITY_METHOD_UNAVAILABLE", service.ErrVerificationUnavailable.Error()
case errors.Is(err, service.ErrVerificationFlowRequired):
status = http.StatusBadRequest
code, message = "SECURITY_VERIFICATION_FLOW_REQUIRED", service.ErrVerificationFlowRequired.Error()
case errors.Is(err, service.ErrProofMethod):
code, message = "SECURITY_PROOF_METHOD_MISMATCH", "This verification method is not allowed for this action."
case errors.Is(err, service.ErrProofScope):
code, message = "SECURITY_PROOF_SCOPE_MISMATCH", "Verification does not match this action."
case errors.Is(err, service.ErrOAuthAccountMismatch):
code, message = "OAUTH_ACCOUNT_MISMATCH", service.ErrOAuthAccountMismatch.Error()
case errors.Is(err, model.ErrTwoFASetupInvalid):
status = http.StatusConflict
code, message = "TWOFA_SETUP_INVALID", model.ErrTwoFASetupInvalid.Error()
case errors.Is(err, model.ErrTwoFACodeInvalid):
code, message = "TWOFA_CODE_INVALID", model.ErrTwoFACodeInvalid.Error()
case errors.Is(err, model.ErrTwoFAAlreadyEnabled):
code, message = "TWOFA_ALREADY_ENABLED", "Two-factor authentication is already enabled."
case errors.Is(err, model.ErrTwoFANotEnabled):
code, message = "TWOFA_NOT_ENABLED", "Two-factor authentication is not enabled."
case errors.Is(err, model.ErrPasskeyNotFound):
code, message = "PASSKEY_NOT_FOUND", "No Passkey is registered."
case errors.Is(err, model.ErrAuthFlowInvalid), errors.Is(err, model.ErrAuthFlowExpired), errors.Is(err, model.ErrAuthFlowConsumed):
code, message = "AUTH_FLOW_INVALID", "Verification flow expired"
case errors.Is(err, model.ErrUserSessionInvalid), errors.Is(err, model.ErrUserSessionInactive):
writeAuthSessionError(c, service.ErrAuthTokenInvalid)
return
default:
c.Set("security_error_code", "AUTH_INTERNAL_ERROR")
writeAuthSessionError(c, err)
return
}
c.Set("security_error_code", code)
if strings.Contains(c.Request.URL.Path, "/passkey/") {
reason := "verification_failed"
if errors.As(err, &protocolError) && slices.Contains([]string{"invalid_request", "challenge_mismatch", "parse_error", "auth_data", "verification_error", "invalid_signature", "invalid_key_type", "unsupported_key_algorithm"}, protocolError.Type) {
reason = protocolError.Type
}
// Protocol details can contain challenges and client-controlled data.
// Only fixed categories and the server-selected public RP ID are logged.
logger.LogWarn(c.Request.Context(), common.LogText("passkey verification rejected: code=%s reason=%s rp_id=%q", code, reason, c.GetString("passkey_rp_id")))
}
// Every message above is fixed English text, so it is also the key the web
// console translates.
common.ApiErrorStatus(c, status, common.NewMessage(message), gin.H{"code": code})
}
// writeAccountStatusError responds with a web console message under a non-200
// status.
func writeAccountStatusError(c *gin.Context, status int, key string) {
common.ApiErrorStatus(c, status, common.NewMessage(key))
}
// requireAdminUserProof consumes the step-up proof for an administrative user
// operation after the caller has already authorized the operator against the
// managed user. context is one of the service.AdminUser*Context structs.
func requireAdminUserProof(c *gin.Context, scope string, context any) *model.AuthFlowAuthorization {
payload, err := common.Marshal(context)
if err != nil {
_ = c.Error(err)
c.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, gin.H{"success": false, "code": "AUTH_INTERNAL_ERROR", "message": "Please try again later."})
return nil
}
return middleware.RequireSecurityProof(c, service.VerificationOperation{Scope: scope, Context: payload})
}
func UniversalVerify(c *gin.Context) {
identity, ok := middleware.GetStepUpIdentity(c)
if !ok {
writeAccountStatusError(c, http.StatusUnauthorized, "The current sign-in method does not support security verification")
return
}
var request service.VerificationInput
if err := common.DecodeJson(c.Request.Body, &request); err != nil {
common.ApiErrorT(c, "Invalid parameters")
return
}
proof, err := service.VerifySecurityInput(identity, request)
if err != nil {
writeSecurityOperationError(c, err)
return
}
recordUserSecurityAudit(c, identity.UserID, "user.security_verify", map[string]any{"method": proof.Method, "scope": proof.Scope})
common.ApiSuccess(c, proof)
}