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David Windsor ff0d1c0915 bpf, lsm: Let BPF LSM provide xattrs at inode creation
Many in-kernel LSMs (SELinux, Smack, IMA) store security labels in extended
attributes. For these LSMs, atomic labeling during inode creation is
critical: if the inode becomes accessible before its xattr is set, it is
briefly unlabeled, which can disrupt LSMs making policy decisions based
on file labels. Existing LSMs solve this by setting xattrs in the
inode_init_security hook, which runs before the inode becomes accessible.
BPF LSM programs currently lack this capability because the hook uses an
output parameter (xattr_count) that BPF programs cannot write to, and
existing kfuncs like bpf_set_dentry_xattr() require a dentry that isn't
available until after the inode is accessible.

Add a bpf_inode_init_xattr() kfunc that takes the hook's own xattrs and
xattr_count arguments, passed through from the program's context, and
claims a slot via lsm_get_xattr_slot() on the program's behalf. The
xattr_count output argument is exposed to inode_init_security programs
as trusted read-only memory, so programs can pass it to the kfunc but
cannot modify the count themselves.

Reserve BPF_LSM_INODE_INIT_XATTRS slots in bpf_lsm_blob_sizes the way
every other xattr-providing LSM does, for the life of the kernel. The
framework keys the collection off the reserved slot count, so a kernel
built with CONFIG_BPF_LSM=y now allocates the xattr array on every inode
creation, whether or not a program sits on the hook.

Give the hook a strong prototype in bpf_lsm_proto.c so that its qstr and
xattrs arguments are marked __nullable. Both can be NULL for some callers.
Without the annotation the verifier otherwise hands the program a trusted
non-NULL pointer which it dereferences. Also, keep the hook out of the
sleepable set. inode_init_security runs inside the transaction creating
the inode, with a journal handle held on ext4 and btrfs and the parent's
i_rwsem down, which is why everything on the path allocates GFP_NOFS.

Co-developed-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260915150739.284189-5-daniel@iogearbox.net
2026-09-19 19:03:14 +00:00
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