Supporting PCM streams requires API changes present in newer releases that
can't be backported, so don't create invalid files.
Signed-off-by: James Almer <jamrial@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 1034b144ff)
It's not valid to call avio_close() on context that has not been open
with avio_open().
This fixes use of custom IO. (io_open / io_close2 callbacks)
Note that by default io_close2 is set to io_close2_default() which calls
avio_close(), so default case will work the same as before.
Signed-off-by: Kacper Michajłow <kasper93@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Rheinhardt <andreas.rheinhardt@outlook.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit 1a7e802c8f)
Fixes: ada-3-poc.mpd
Found-by: Claude and Ada Logics. This issue was found by Anthropic from using agents to study security of open source projects, and I am from Ada Logics helping validate the found issues and report to maintainers.
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit b99c6fc8c3)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Reported by Franciszek Kalinowski (isec.pl / striga.ai) and Bartosz Smigielski.
(cherry picked from commit 99e1ecca36)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Commit 5b98cea4 added a size < 2 guard to sctp_write() to prevent
out-of-bounds access when max_streams is enabled, but the identical
pattern in sctp_read() was not addressed.
When max_streams is non-zero, sctp_read() passes (buf + 2, size - 2)
to ff_sctp_recvmsg(). If size < 2, size - 2 wraps to a large value
on the implicit cast to size_t in the callee.
Add the same guard.
Signed-off-by: bird <6666242+bird@users.noreply.github.com>
(cherry picked from commit 5c3602abaa)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Reported by Franciszek Kalinowski (isec.pl / striga.ai) and Bartosz Smigielski.
(cherry picked from commit 6049b4d7bc)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Fixes out of array access
Found-by: Cloud-LHY (@Clouditera-lhy) / VulnForge Security Research Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit dd9083cb89)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
ispe width/height are read as uint32 but stored in int HEIFItem fields;
values above INT_MAX became negative, and read_image_grid() summing such
widths into coded_width overflowed int:
libavformat/mov.c:10404:33: runtime error: signed integer overflow: -2147483647 + -2147483647 cannot be represented in type 'int'
Also accumulate the grid tile dimensions and running offsets in 64bit
and validate the totals, as up to 256 tile columns of individually
valid widths can still overflow int.
Found-by: 51511
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit 2cc7b87bdb)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
After the fix the reproducer finishes in 43 ms instead of OOM-ing at the
2 GB limit. Legitimate .mkv/.webm fate samples still parse cleanly.
Fixes: 471604245/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_dem_WEBM_DASH_MANIFEST_fuzzer-6662979358883840
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit c7e0bac050)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Based on flvdec.c
Fixes: out of array access
Found-by: Xueqing
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit 92804c9e25)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
ftp_connect() interpolates the URL path into SIZE/RETR/STOR/CWD/DELE/RMD/RNFR
commands without checking for CR/LF, although it already rejects CR/LF in the
user and password fields. Reject CR/LF in s->path the same way.
Reported and reviewed by Franciszek Kalinowski (isec.pl / striga.ai) and Bartosz Śmigielski.
(cherry picked from commit 640f32b1b6)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Found-by: Calm (AI security-research agent, for John Bradley / Credex)
(cherry picked from commit 8f1769703c)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Fixes: UB with out of range values
Fixes: poc_overflow.m3u8
Found-by: jiale yao
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit 59094859a8)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Fixes: ada-4-poc.ty
change is based on the suggested fix
Found-by: Claude and Ada Logics. This issue was found by Anthropic from using agents to study security of open source projects
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit 4492ad7228)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Reported by Franciszek Kalinowski (isec.pl / striga.ai) and Bartosz Smigielski.
(cherry picked from commit 0857141823)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
When extradata_size == 0, ff_rtp_send_aac() does `size -= 7` to skip the
ADTS header without checking size >= 7. A short packet makes size negative,
and the value is later passed to memcpy() as size_t, reading past the buffer
end. Bail out instead.
The vulnerable branch is not reached when using the built-in AAC encoder
(which always emits extradata), but an application that feeds raw
ADTS-stripped AAC packets through the libavformat RTP muxer can hit it. The
fix is a one-line lower-bound check and compiles/runs cleanly; see audit
PoC for the static analysis and reachable-by-API write-up.
Reported by Franciszek Kalinowski (isec.pl / striga.ai) and Bartosz Smigielski.
(cherry picked from commit a44cae9025)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Fixes: ada-1-poc.mkv
Found-by: Claude and Ada Logics. This issue was found by Anthropic from using agents to study security of open source projects, and I am from Ada Logics helping validate the found issues and report to maintainers.
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit 08d7646abf)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
The potentially negative return value of av_index_search_timestamp()
wasn't being handled before passing it to can_seek_to_key_sample().
Found by Wongi Lee (@_qwerty_po) of Theori with Xint Code,
Jungwoo Lee (@physicube).
Signed-off-by: Dale Curtis <dalecurtis@chromium.org>
(cherry picked from commit 256d93413f)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
They are optional and just define a channel layout, which may also be defined
by the underlying codec.
Signed-off-by: James Almer <jamrial@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 95fe0658d7)
Needed to keep the process going if some issue was found while parsing these boxes.
Signed-off-by: James Almer <jamrial@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit fd1c8fa0e6)
celt_header() reads a uint32 `extra_headers` field from the CELT identification
header and stores `1 + extra_headers` into the signed int extra_headers_left.
With extra_headers = 0x7FFFFFFE this becomes INT_MAX and the OGG parser
consumes every subsequent page as a CELT "extra header" without ever reaching
audio data, hanging on any streaming input. A value of 0xFFFFFFFE wraps the
signed addition negative, with the same family of consequences.
Reject any extra_headers count above a small fixed cap (16, well above any
real CELT-over-Ogg stream).
Verified with the audit PoC (a crafted file plus an infinite-page FIFO):
without the patch, ffmpeg consumes pages forever; with the patch it logs
"Too many CELT extra headers (...)" and exits in ~70 ms with
AVERROR_INVALIDDATA.
Reported by Franciszek Kalinowski (isec.pl / striga.ai) and Bartosz Smigielski.
(cherry picked from commit 87439ed619)
You may look and think `AVFMT_FLAG_CUSTOM_IO` check is enough, but this
is not what it seems. This flag means that user provided custom
AVIOContext, before creating AVFormatContext and it should not be
closed. However nested sub-demuxers may still open an temporary io, and
those have to be closed and use correct io_close2 function.
You can see 0dcac9c3f0 and
ef01061225 where this flag is cleared for
nested opens to avoid leaking those.
lavf micro version bumped so API users can know if it is safe to use
custom io.
(cherry picked from commit dc74fe70b2)
Signed-off-by: Kacper Michajłow <kasper93@gmail.com>
io_open_default() will call internal impl if needed, don't call it
directly.
(cherry picked from commit 06ef9a74ea)
Signed-off-by: Kacper Michajłow <kasper93@gmail.com>
io_open_default() will call internal impl if needed, don't call it
directly.
(cherry picked from commit 4cf687b3b1)
Signed-off-by: Kacper Michajłow <kasper93@gmail.com>
io_open_default() will call internal impl if needed, don't call it
directly.
(cherry picked from commit fbc4003642)
Signed-off-by: Kacper Michajłow <kasper93@gmail.com>
This avoids an unsigned integer underflow and passing that large value to ff_read_riff_info()
(cherry picked from commit 2678bce860)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Reject INFO list chunks that are too small to contain the expected
4-byte list type field before calling ff_read_riff_info().
The parser subtracts 4 from the list size when handing the remaining
payload to ff_read_riff_info(). If the chunk is smaller than 4 bytes,
that underflows the expected structure and should be treated as invalid
input.
Fixes: DFVULN-607
*Vulnerability reported by Zhenpeng (Leo) Lin at depthfirst*
*Patch validated by Zheng Yu at depthfirst*
(cherry picked from commit f1c3f1cae1)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
James Almer