Reject block_align larger than the sub_packet_h * frame_size buffer to
avoid a heap out-of-bounds write when deinterleaving RealAudio subpackets.
(cherry picked from commit 20fc83fa5b... adapted to 5.1 structure)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
It may be invalidated by the time it is used.
Fixes use after free when accessing current segment.
Fixes: #10825
Signed-off-by: J. Dekker <jdek@itanimul.li>
(cherry picked from commit b2b23f353a)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit 6c395546f0)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Fixes: ada-3-poc.mpd
Found-by: Claude and Ada Logics. This issue was found by Anthropic from using agents to study security of open source projects, and I am from Ada Logics helping validate the found issues and report to maintainers.
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit b99c6fc8c3)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Reported by Franciszek Kalinowski (isec.pl / striga.ai) and Bartosz Smigielski.
(cherry picked from commit 99e1ecca36)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Commit 5b98cea4 added a size < 2 guard to sctp_write() to prevent
out-of-bounds access when max_streams is enabled, but the identical
pattern in sctp_read() was not addressed.
When max_streams is non-zero, sctp_read() passes (buf + 2, size - 2)
to ff_sctp_recvmsg(). If size < 2, size - 2 wraps to a large value
on the implicit cast to size_t in the callee.
Add the same guard.
Signed-off-by: bird <6666242+bird@users.noreply.github.com>
(cherry picked from commit 5c3602abaa)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Reported by Franciszek Kalinowski (isec.pl / striga.ai) and Bartosz Smigielski.
(cherry picked from commit 6049b4d7bc)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Fixes out of array access
Found-by: Cloud-LHY (@Clouditera-lhy) / VulnForge Security Research Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit dd9083cb89)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
After the fix the reproducer finishes in 43 ms instead of OOM-ing at the
2 GB limit. Legitimate .mkv/.webm fate samples still parse cleanly.
Fixes: 471604245/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_dem_WEBM_DASH_MANIFEST_fuzzer-6662979358883840
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit c7e0bac050)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Based on flvdec.c
Fixes: out of array access
Found-by: Xueqing
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit 92804c9e25)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
ftp_connect() interpolates the URL path into SIZE/RETR/STOR/CWD/DELE/RMD/RNFR
commands without checking for CR/LF, although it already rejects CR/LF in the
user and password fields. Reject CR/LF in s->path the same way.
Reported and reviewed by Franciszek Kalinowski (isec.pl / striga.ai) and Bartosz Śmigielski.
(cherry picked from commit 640f32b1b6)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Found-by: Calm (AI security-research agent, for John Bradley / Credex)
(cherry picked from commit 8f1769703c)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Fixes: UB with out of range values
Fixes: poc_overflow.m3u8
Found-by: jiale yao
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit 59094859a8)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Fixes: ada-4-poc.ty
change is based on the suggested fix
Found-by: Claude and Ada Logics. This issue was found by Anthropic from using agents to study security of open source projects
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit 4492ad7228)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Reported by Franciszek Kalinowski (isec.pl / striga.ai) and Bartosz Smigielski.
(cherry picked from commit 0857141823)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
When extradata_size == 0, ff_rtp_send_aac() does `size -= 7` to skip the
ADTS header without checking size >= 7. A short packet makes size negative,
and the value is later passed to memcpy() as size_t, reading past the buffer
end. Bail out instead.
The vulnerable branch is not reached when using the built-in AAC encoder
(which always emits extradata), but an application that feeds raw
ADTS-stripped AAC packets through the libavformat RTP muxer can hit it. The
fix is a one-line lower-bound check and compiles/runs cleanly; see audit
PoC for the static analysis and reachable-by-API write-up.
Reported by Franciszek Kalinowski (isec.pl / striga.ai) and Bartosz Smigielski.
(cherry picked from commit a44cae9025)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
This avoids an unsigned integer underflow and passing that large value to ff_read_riff_info()
(cherry picked from commit 2678bce860)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Reject INFO list chunks that are too small to contain the expected
4-byte list type field before calling ff_read_riff_info().
The parser subtracts 4 from the list size when handing the remaining
payload to ff_read_riff_info(). If the chunk is smaller than 4 bytes,
that underflows the expected structure and should be treated as invalid
input.
Fixes: DFVULN-607
*Vulnerability reported by Zhenpeng (Leo) Lin at depthfirst*
*Patch validated by Zheng Yu at depthfirst*
(cherry picked from commit f1c3f1cae1)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Reject AU header sections with a signaled length of zero in
rtp_parse_mp4_au().
The AU-headers-length field specifies the length in bits of the AU header
section that immediately follows. A zero-length section is not useful input
for this parser and can lead to invalid downstream state, so reject it
up front together with oversized values.
*Vulnerability reported by Zhenpeng (Leo) Lin at depthfirst*
*Patch validated by Zheng Yu at depthfirst*
Fixes: OOB read
(cherry picked from commit 8010aa2193)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Reject truncated compressed SWF input before attempting to read the
8-byte header in rtmp_calc_swfhash().
Compressed SWF data identified by the "CWS" signature must be at least
8 bytes long to contain the fixed header. Bail out early when the input
is shorter to avoid operating on malformed data.
*Vulnerability reported by Zhenpeng (Leo) Lin at depthfirst*
*Patch validated by Zheng Yu at depthfirst*
Fixes: DFVULN-612
(cherry picked from commit 52b78cd3fe)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Guard against empty string before reading the last byte in control_url.
When parsing relative a=control: paths, if no base control URL was set,
the code would access control_url[strlen(control_url)-1] which on an
empty string causes a size_t underflow and out-of-bounds read.
Now compute the length first and check for len == 0 before array access.
*Vulnerability reported by Zhenpeng (Leo) Lin at depthfirst*
*Patch validated by Zheng Yu at depthfirst*
Fixes: DFVULN-611
(cherry picked from commit 1a00ea51cb)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
latm_parse_packet() accumulated attacker-controlled AU length bytes in
a signed int and later checked data->pos + cur_len against data->len.
That addition could overflow, allowing malformed packets to bypass the
bounds check and drive memcpy() far past the end of the LATM buffer.
Reject length-byte accumulation that would exceed the remaining packet
size, and compare cur_len against the remaining buffer space using
subtraction so the bounds check cannot overflow.
Fixes: DFVULN-610
*Vulnerability reported by Zhenpeng (Leo) Lin at depthfirst*
*Patch validated by Zheng Yu at depthfirst*
(cherry picked from commit 664d44a825)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
av_index_search_timestamp() returns a negative value when a seek target
cannot be resolved from the stream index. Bail out before using that
result as an index into sti->index_entries to avoid out-of-bounds reads.
Fixes: Buffer underflow
Fixes: DFVULN-608
*Vulnerability reported by Zhenpeng (Leo) Lin at depthfirst*
*Patch validated by Zheng Yu at depthfirst*
(cherry picked from commit 5408059eb7)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 605/pc.py
Based-on patch by depthfirst
*Reporter: Zhenpeng (Leo) Lin at depthfirst*
(cherry picked from commit 91d29be49a)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
Timo Rothenpieler